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Keywords:   EMPLOYMENT — contracting out of human rights legislation — TRADE UNIONS — collective agreement provision used to contract out of human rights legislation — BUSINESS NECESSITY — employment policy discriminatory for economic reasons — RETIREMENT — mandatory retirement for firefighters — BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION — age for firefighter — Etobicoke test — OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY — age and potential impairment — safety risk to self and others — BURDEN OF PROOF — elements of a prima facie case

Summary:  In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Canada rules that the retirement of firefighters at age 60 by the Borough of Etobicoke constitutes a violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code because the employer in the case did not discharge the onus of proof necessary to establish that the early mandatory retirement age was justified by a bona fide occupational requirement.

This appeal is from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which, along with the Divisional Court, reversed the original Board of Inquiry ruling that the firefighters were discriminated against because of their age. The Board of Inquiry found that the Borough of Etobicoke failed to discharge the burden of proof upon them to show that the discrimination was based on a bona fide occupational requirement. The Board found that the evidence provided was "impressionistic" and noted the insufficiency of general assertions by witnesses that firefighting is a "young man's game".

The Supreme Court unanimously restores this decision of the Board of Inquiry. The Supreme Court rules that the evidence adduced before the Board of Inquiry was inadequate to discharge the burden of proof lying upon the employer, finding that the evidence did not cover the detailed nature of the duties to be performed, the conditions existing in the workplace, and the effect of such conditions upon employees, particularly upon those at or near the retirement age sought to be supported.

The Supreme Court also rejects the respondent's argument that because the early mandatory retirement age had been agreed to in the terms of the collective agreement with the union representing the appellant firefighters, the early retirement age should be considered bona fide. The Court rules that parties cannot contract out of the provisions of an enactment like the Ontario Human Rights Code which constitutes public policy and that contracts having such effect are void.

Employers Liable for Sexual Harassment of Employee

Keywords:   EMPLOYMENT — LIABILITY — vicarious liability — employer liability for manager — mitigation of effects of discrimination — DISCRIMINATION — adverse effect discrimination — direct discrimination — intention to discriminate — SEXUAL HARASSMENT — sexual advances by supervisor — HUMAN RIGHTS — nature and purpose of human rights legislation

Summary:  The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously finds that employers are liable for the discriminatory acts of their employees in the course of their employment.

This is an appeal by Bonnie Robichaud and the Canadian Human Rights Commission from a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which ruled that, although Ms. Robichaud was sexually harassed by her supervisor while she was employed by the Department of National Defence, the Department of National Defence was not liable for the contravention of her rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada in overturning this decision finds that the purpose of human rights legislation is to remove discrimination. The legislative emphasis is not on finding fault, but on remedying discrimination. The purpose of the Canadian Human Rights Act which is to prevent discrimination and eliminate the effects of discriminatory acts would be thwarted by an interpretation which deemed employers not liable for the conduct of their employees. The Act is concerned with the effects of discrimination not causes, and only an employer can remedy undesirable effects. Reinstatement of an employee, compensation for lost wages, and a discrimination-free environment are remedies only an employer can provide. The remedial objectives of the Canadian Human Rights Act would be stultified if remedies were not available as against the employer.

It is unnecessary to attach any label to this liability; it is purely statutory. It serves the purpose of placing responsibility for an organization on those who control it and are in a position to take effective remedial action.

While the conduct of an employer is irrelevant to the imposition of liability, a quick and effective response to remedy discrimination and prevent its recurrence is likely to affect the remedial consequences of a violation of the law.

In a concurring judgment, The Honourable Mr. Justice Le Dain finds that employers are liable under s. 7 of the Act because the section prohibits discriminatory acts undertaken directly or indirectly. Because indirect discrimination is prohibited the employer is liable for discriminatory practices whether or not they were authorized or intended by the employer.

The appeal is allowed.

Mandatory Retirement Upheld by S.C.C.

Keywords:   EMPLOYMENT — RETIREMENT — mandatory retirement contravenes Charter — eduction sector — EDUCATION — mandatory retirement for teachers and professors — EXEMPTIONS — age — CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS — s. 1 (reasonable limits) to right to be protected from discrimination on basis of age — s. 15 (1) (equality) — s. 32 (application of Charter) — application of three-part test — EQUALITY — relationship between equality under human rights legislation and equality under the Charter — INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — definition of "age"

English Summary:   By a majority, the Supreme Court of Canada rules that mandatory retirement at age 65 is a reasonable limit on the s. 15 right to be protected from discrimination because of age. In five different judgments, the Supreme Court hands down a split 5-2 decision.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which dismissed the applications of eight professors and a librarian at four Ontario universities for declarations that the policies of the universities requiring them to retire at age 65 violate s. 15, and that s. 9(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code, by failing to protect those over age 65, also violates s. 15.

The issues before the Court are:

1. whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to universities;
2. if the Charter does apply to universities, whether mandatory retirement policies violate s. 15;
3. whether the limitation of the prohibition against age discrimination in the Ontario Human Rights Code to persons between the ages of 18 and 65 violates s. 15; and
4. if the limitation does violate s. 15, whether it is justifiable under s. 1 as a reasonable limit on an equality right.

La Forest J., writing for the majority, states that the Charter is essentially an instrument for checking the power of government over the individual. Private activity was deliberately excluded from the Charter's ambit. While it is true that the rights of individuals can be offended by private actors, governments can regulate in this sphere or create distinct bodies for the protection of human rights. Constitutional review of private action is not mandated by the Charter and it would diminish the area of freedom within which individuals can act.

Section 32 of the Charter states that the Charter applies to the legislature and government of each province. The majority finds that universities are not part of government within the meaning of s. 32. The Court rejects arguments that the Charter applies to universities because they are creatures of statute carrying out an important public service, or because their survival depends on government funding, or because their powers, objects, activities and governing structures are determined by government. Despite all of these controls, the majority finds, universities are legally autonomous; they control their own affairs and enjoy independence from government regarding all important internal matters. Their decisions are not government decisions.

Though the majority of the Court rules that the Charter does not apply to universities, they nonetheless consider the question of whether university mandatory retirement policies offend s. 15.

First, the majority decides that if the universities were part of the fabric of government, their policies on mandatory retirement would amount to "law" within the meaning of s. 15. All actions taken pursuant to powers granted by law, not merely legislative activities, will fall within the ambit of s. 15 of the Charter.

The majority then finds that the mandatory retirement policies of the universities violate s. 15. Mandatory retirement deprives a person of work, which is one of the most fundamental aspects of a person's life, based on the assumption that, because of age, the individual is less competent than younger persons.

However, the mandatory retirement policies would be saved by s. 1 because they are a reasonable limit on the equality rights guaranteed to older persons.

The universities' objectives for the mandatory retirement policies are pressing and substantial. These objectives are to enhance their capacity to seek and maintain excellence by permitting flexibility in resource allocation and faculty renewal, and to preserve academic freedom and the collegial form of association by minimizing intrusive modes of performance appraisal.

Mandatory retirement, the majority finds, supports the tenure system by obviating the need for elaborate evaluation schemes, and ensures continuing faculty renewal by making spaces available in a closed system for new and younger faculty members. Therefore, there is a rational connection between the university policies and the objectives sought to be achieved.

On the issue of whether the policies impair the rights of older workers as little as possible, the majority rules that the test to be applied is not whether the right is impaired as little as possible but whether the university had a reasonable basis for concluding that the policy impaired the right as little as possible. This is a relaxed s. 1 test, adopted in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) to provide greater flexibility in assessing those cases where legislatures have had to make difficult choices between the claims of competing groups.

In this case, the majority concludes that there was a reasonable basis for concluding that the policy impaired the right as little as possible because mandatory retirement is not wholly detrimental to the group affected. The policy ensures that faculty members have a large measure of academic freedom and it is generally beneficial both to the universities and the individuals in them. Consequently, the minimal impairment of rights does not outweigh the universities' pressing and substantial objectives.

However, since the majority has ruled that the Charter does not apply to universities, the Court turns to the issue of whether the limitation of protection from age discrimination in s. 9(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code to persons between 18 and 65, which allows mandatory retirement policies to exist for those 65 and over, is unconstitutional because it violates s. 15. Some of the faculty members who are the appellants in this case attempted to file complaints with the Ontario Human Rights Commission, but their complaints were refused because of the restricted jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to age discrimination.

The majority of the Court finds that policies of mandatory retirement were developed with the introduction of private and public pension plans. Mandatory retirement policies have had a profound impact on the organization of the workplace and on the structuring of pension plans, on fairness and security of tenure in the workplace, and on work opportunities for others. One of the objectives of s. 9(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code was to arrive at a legislative compromise between protecting individuals from discrimination and giving employers and employees freedom to agree on a date of termination considered beneficial to both.

The objectives of government in passing s. 9(a) of the Code, the majority concludes, were pressing and substantial. Government objectives were to preserve the integrity of pension plans and to foster the prospects of younger workers. The majority of the Court finds that the legislature was faced with a complex socio-economic problem. In these circumstances, the majority considers that the limitation of protection in the Code is rationally connected to the objectives and that it minimally impairs the equality rights of older workers. Government had a reasonable basis for imposing what is a generally beneficial rule. The courts should adopt a stance that encourages legislative advances in the protection of human rights. But the courts should not lightly use the Charter to second-guess the judgment of a legislature as to just how quickly it should proceed in moving forward towards equality.

The appeal is dismissed.

In dissent, Wilson J. rejects the view, adopted by the majority of the Court, that the freedom guaranteed by the Charter is freedom for private individuals from government intervention. She finds that in Canada government has traditionally played a role in the creation and preservation of a just society. The state has been looked to and has responded to demands that Canadians be guaranteed adequate health care, access to education and a minimum level of financial security. Freedom has often required the intervention and protection of government against private action.

Wilson J. finds that where entities are not self-evidently part of the legislative, executive or administrative branch of government, some questions should be asked to determine whether the Charter applies. Does government control the entity in question? Does it perform a traditional government function or a function recognized as a responsibility of the state? Does it act pursuant to statutory powers given to it to further a government or public interest objective? Given the connections between governments and universities, and given that education at every level is a traditional function of government in Canada, Wilson J. concludes that universities form part of government for the purposes of s. 32 of the Charter.

Mandatory retirement is the law of the workplace at the universities, and, as such, Wilson J. finds that it is "law" within the meaning of s. 15. But s. 15 does not require that there be a discriminatory law, only that there be discrimination which must be redressed by the law.

Section 15 is infringed, Wilson J. concludes, because the mandatory retirement policies of the universities were based on the assumption that with age comes increasing incompetence.

Turning to s. 1, Wilson J. finds that the mandatory retirement policies are not saved by s. 1 because they do not impair the equality right as little as possible. There is no justification in this case to apply a relaxed s. 1 test. Where the legislature is forced to strike a balance between the claims of competing groups, and particularly where the legislature has sought to promote or protect the interests of vulnerable or less advantaged groups, the Court should approach the application of the minimal impairment test with a healthy measure of restraint. However, the universities seek to reap the benefit of this more flexible test fashioned in Irwin Toy on the basis that their mandatory retirement policy was intended to make available positions for younger academics. Young academics are not the kind of "vulnerable" group contemplated in Irwin Toy.

Wilson J. also finds that s. 9(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code violates s. 15 because it strips persons over age 65 of all protection against employment discrimination. Once the government decides to provide protection it must do so in a non-discriminatory manner.

Section 9(a) should be struck down in its entirety, Wilson J. concludes. It cannot be saved by s. 1 since it cannot pass the minimal impairment test. The majority of individuals affected by s. 9(a) will suffer greater hardship because of the infringement of their rights. Therefore, the provision cannot be said to impair their rights as little as possible.

Wilson J. would declare that the university policies requiring mandatory retirement at age 65 violate s. 15 of the Charter and are of no force and effect. She would also order reinstatement in employment for the appellants with all the attendant benefits, and compensation for losses incurred because of the breach of rights.

L'Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting, concludes that the Charter does not apply to universities. However, she finds that s. 9(a) of the Ontario Human Rights Code violates s. 15 and cannot be saved by s. 1.

Sommaire en français:   À la majorité, la Cour suprême du Canada statue que la retraite obligatoire à l’âge de 65 ans est une limite raisonnable au droit de protection contre la discrimination fondée sur l’âge prévu à l'aarticle 15. Dans le cadre de cinq arrêts distincts, la Cour suprême prononce une décision mitigée de 5 à 2.

Le tribunal est saisi du pourvoi contre une décision de la Cour d'aappel de l’Ontario qui avait rejeté la demande de huit professeurs et d’un bibliothécaire de quatre universités de l’Ontario portant que les politiques des universités en matière de retraite obligatoire à l’âge de 65 ans violent l'aarticle 15 de la Charte et que l'aalinéa 9a) du Code des droits de la personne du Ontario, en ne traitant pas les personnes âgées de plus de 65 ans de la même manière que les autres, enfreint également l'aart. 15.

La Cour est saisie des questions suivantes:

1. La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés s'aapplique-t-elle aux universités?
2. En supposant qu’elle s’y applique, les politiques des universités concernant la retraite obligatoire à l'âge de 65 ans violent-elles l'aart. 15?
3. La restriction de l’interdiction de toute discrimination fondée sur l'âge du Code ontarien des droits de la personne, aux personnes de 18 à 65 ans, viole-t-elle l'aart 15?
4. Si la restriction viole l'aart. 15, est-elle justifiable en vertu de l'aarticle premier en tant que limite raisonnable au droit d'égalité?

Le juge La Forest, s’exprimant au nom de la majorité, déclare que la Charte est essentiellement un instrument de contrôle des pouvoirs du gouvernement sur le particulier. L’exclusion des activités privées de l'aapplication de la Charte n’est pas le fruit du hasard. Bien que les atteintes aux droits des particuliers puissent provenir du secteur privé, le gouvernement peut soit les réglementer, soit créer des organismes distincts afin de protéger les droits de la personne. L’examen constitutionnel des actions de nature privée n’est pas mandaté par la Charte et restreindrait la liberté d'aaction des particuliers.

L'aart. 32 de la Charte précise que la Charte s'aapplique à la législature et au gouvernement de chaque province. La majorité conclut que les universités ne font pas partie du gouvernement au sent de l'aart. 32. La Cour rejette les prétentions à l’effet que la Charte s'aapplique aux universités parce qu’elles sont créées par la loi et rendent un important service public, ou parce que leur survie dépend de fonds publics, ou parce que leurs pouvoirs, leurs objets, leurs activités et leur structure réglementaire sont déterminés par le gouvernement. Malgré tous ces contrôles, conclut la majorité, les universités sont légalement autonomes; elles voient à leurs propres affaires et sont indépendantes du gouvernement à l'égard de toutes les importantes questions d’ordre interne. Leurs décisions ne sont pas des décisions du gouvernement.

Bien que la majorité de la Cour statue que la Charte ne s'aapplique pas aux universités, elle se penche néanmoins sur la question de savoir si les politiques de retraite obligatoire violent l'aart. 15.

En premier lieu, la majorité détermine que, si les universités faisaient partie de l'aappareil du gouvernement, leurs politiques de retraite obligatoire équivaudraient à une "loi" au sens de l'aart 15. Tous les actes accomplis en application des pouvoirs accordés par la loi, et non seulement les activités législatives, feraient partie du cadre de l'aart. de la Charte.

La majorité conclut que les politiques des universités violent l'aart. 15. La retraite obligatoire prive une personne de travail, l’un des aspects les plus fondamentaux de la vie d’une personne, sur la base de l’hypothèse que, en raison de son âge, la personne est moins compétente qu’une personne plus jeune.

Par ailleurs, les politiques de retraite obligatoire pourraient être sauvegardées par l'aarticle premier parce qu’elles imposent une limite raisonnable aux droits d'égalité garantis aux personnes plus âgées.

Les politiques de retraite obligatoire des universités sont motivées par des objectifs urgents et réels. Elles doivent accroître et conserver leurs aptitudes à rechercher et à maintenir l’excellence en faisant usage de souplesse dans la répartition des ressources et le renouvellement du corps professoral, et préserver la liberté académique et la collégialité en réduisant autant que possible les modes importuns d’évaluation du rendement.

La retraite obligatoire supporte le régime de la permanence car elle permet d'éviter les plans d'évaluation complexes et veille au renouvellement des membres du corps professoral en rendant des postes accessibles à de nouveaux professeurs plus jeunes. Il y a donc un lien rationnel entre les politiques des universités et les objectifs visés.

Quant à la question de savoir si les politiques portent le moins possible atteinte aux droits des travailleurs plus âgés, la majorité statue que le critère n’est pas de savoir si les droits sont affectés le moins possible, mais si l’université était raisonnablement fondée à conclure que la politique portait le moins possible atteinte aux droits. Cette version plus souple du critère de l'aarticle premier a été adoptée dans l'aarrêt Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général) afin d’offrir une plus grande flexibilité dans l'évaluation des cas où les législateurs doivent faire des choix difficiles entre les revendications contraires de groupes.

Dans le cas présent, la majorité conclut que les universités étaient raisonnablement fondées à conclure que leur politique portait le moins possible atteinte aux droits parce que la retraite obligatoire n’était pas entièrement au détriment du groupe visé. La politique veille à ce que les membres du corps professoral jouissent d’une grande liberté académique et elle est généralement bénéfique à la fois aux universités et aux personnes qui en font partie. Ainsi, l'aatteinte minimale aux droits ne l’emporte pas sur les objectifs urgents et réels des universités.

Ayant statué que la Charte ne s'aapplique pas aux universités, la Cour se penche sur la question de savoir si l'alinéa 9a) du Code ontarien des droits de la personne contrevient au par. 15(1) de la Charte du fait qu’il restreint l'aapplication de l’interdiction de toute discrimination fondée sur l'âge aux personnes âgées de 18 à 65 ans, et permet l’existence de politiques de retraite obligatoire pour les personnes âgées de plus de 65 ans. Certains membres du corps professoral, des appelants dans la présente cause, ont demandé l'aautorisation de déposer une plainte devant la Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne, mais l'aautorisation leur a été refusée en raison de la compétence restreinte de la Commission concernant la discrimination fondé sur l'âge.

La majorité de la Cour a rappelé que les politiques en matière de retraite obligatoire ont vu le jour avec l'aadoption des régimes de retraite privés et publics. Les politiques en matière de retraite obligatoire ont eu une grande incidence sur l’organisation du marché du travail et la structure des régimes de retraite, sur l'équité et la permanence au travail, et sur les possibilités d’emploi pour les autres. L’un des objectifs de l'alinéa 9a) du Code des droits de la personne du Ontario était d'aarriver à un compromis législatif entre protéger les individus contre la discrimination et donner aux employeurs et employés la liberté de s’entendre sur une date de cessation d’emploi convenant aux deux parties.

Selon les conclusions de la majorité, le gouvernement avait ratifié l'alinéa 9a) du Code pour des objectifs urgents et réels. Le gouvernement visait à conserver l'intégrité des régimes de retraite et à améliorer les perspectives d'aavenir des jeunes travailleurs. La majorité de la Cour conclut que la législature faisait face à un problème d’ordre socio-économique. Dans ces circonstances, elle considère que la restriction de la protection en vertu du Code a un lien rationnel avec les objectifs et porte le moins possible atteinte aux droits d'égalité des travailleurs plus âgés. Le gouvernement était raisonnablement fondé à imposer une règle qui est généralement bénéfique. Les tribunaux devraient adopter une position qui favorise les progrès législatifs sur le plan de la protection des droits de la personne. Par ailleurs, les tribunaux ne devraient pas se servir à la légère de la Charte pour se prononcer après coup sur le jugement du législateur afin de déterminer le rythme qu’il devrait emprunter pour parvenir à l'idéal de légalité.

L'aappel est rejeté.

Le juge Wilson, dissidente, rejette la vue adoptée par la majorité à l’effet que la liberté garantie par la Charte est la libération des particuliers de l’intervention du gouvernement. Elle affirme que le gouvernement au Canada a traditionnellement joué un rôle dans la création et le maintien d’une juste société. On s’est adressé à l’État et celui-ci a toujours répondu aux demandes visant à assurer aux Canadiens des soins de santé adéquats, l'aaccès à la formation et un niveau minimum de sécurité financière. La liberté a souvent exigé l’intervention et la protection du gouvernement contre l'aaction privée.

Wilson J. Conclut qu’il faut se poser les questions suivantes quant aux entités dont il n’est pas évident en soi qu’elles font partie des branches législative, exécutive ou administrative du gouvernement, pour déterminer si elles sont assujetties à la Charte. Le gouvernement exerce-t-il un contrôle sur l’entité en question? L’entité exerce-t-elle une fonction gouvernementale traditionnelle ou une fonction qui, de nos jours, est reconnue comme une responsabilité de l'État? L'entité agit-elle conformément au pouvoir que la loi lui a expressément conféré en vue d'aatteindre un objectif que le gouvernement cherche à promouvoir dans le plus grand intérêt public? En raison des divers liens qui existent entre les gouvernements et les universités, et étant donné que la formation à tous les niveaux est une fonction traditionnelle du gouvernement au Canada, Wilson J. Conclut que les universités font partie du gouvernement aux fins de l'aart. 32 de la Charte.

La retraite obligatoire est la loi du milieu de travail universitaire et est, comme telle, la "loi" au sens de l'aart 15, selon Wilson J. Mais l'aart 15 n’exige pas de chercher une loi discriminatoire, mais simplement de chercher une discrimination à laquelle la loi doit remédier.

L'aart. 15 est violé déclare Wilson J., parce que les politiques de retraite obligatoire des universités sont fondées sur l’hypothèse qu’il y a diminution de la compétence ave l'âge.

Wilson J. déclare que les politiques de retraite obligatoire ne sont pas sauvegardées par l'aarticle premier parce qu’elles ne portent pas le moins possible atteinte au droit d'égalité. Dans la présente cause, rien ne justifie l'aapplication d’un critère plus souple en vertu de l'aarticle premier. Lorsque la législature est forcée d'établir l'équilibre entre les revendications contraires de groupes, et notamment lorsque la législature a cherché à promouvoir ou à protéger les intérêts de groupes vulnérables ou moins avantagés, la Cour devrait envisager avec circonspection l'aapplication du critère de l'aatteinte minimale. D'aautre part, les universités cherchent à profiter des avantages du critère plus souple élaboré dans la cause Irwin Toy sur la base que leur politique de retraite obligatoire vise à rendre des postes accessibles aux plus jeunes professeurs. Les jeunes professeurs ne font pas partie du genre de groupe "vulnérable" envisagé dans l'arrêt Irwin Toy.

Wilson J. conclut également que l'alinéa 9a) du Code ontarien des droits de la personne enfreint l'aart. 15 parce qu’il prive les personnes âgées de plus de 65 ans de la protection contre la discrimination en matière d’emploi. Lorsque le gouvernement décide d'aaccorder une protection, il doit le faire d’une manière non discriminatoire.

L'alinéa 9a) en entier devrait être invalidé, conclut Wilson J. Il ne peut être sauvegardé par l'aarticle premier puisqu’il ne peut se conformer au critère de l'aatteinte minimale. Si la majorité des personnes touchées par l'alinéa 9a) souffrent un préjudice démesurément grave par suite de la violation de leurs droits, la loi contestée ne porte pas le moins possible atteinte à leurs droits.

Wilson J. déclarerait que les politiques des universités exigeant la retraite obligatoire à l'âge de 65 ans violent l'aarticle 15 de la Charte et sont nulles et invalides. Elle ordonnerait également la réintégration des appelants à leurs postes, ainsi qu’à tous les avantages connexes, et des dommages-intérêts compensatoires au titre de l'aatteinte à leurs droits.

Le juge L’Heureux-Dubé, dissidente, conclut que la Charte ne s'aapplique pas aux universités. Elle conclut par ailleurs que l'alinéa 9a) du Code ontarien des droits de la personne enfreint l'aart. 15 et ne peut être sauvegardé par l'aarticle premier.

S.C.C. Finds Union Has Duty to Accommodate Religious Beliefs

Keywords:   EMPLOYMENT — TRADE UNIONS — union supports discriminatory policy — LIABILITY — union liability — RELIGION AND CREED — employment terminated — BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION — Friday night shift — relationship to individual employee — REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION — duty to accommodate where bona fide occupational qualification exists — complainant’s duty to accommodate — duty to accommodate short of undue hardship — work shift — definition of undue hardship

Summary:  In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Canada restores the decision of the B.C. Council of Human Rights, which found that Larry Renaud was discriminated against by both his employer and his union because of his religious beliefs.

Mr. Renaud, a school custodian, is a Seventh Day Adventist. His religious beliefs prevented him from working from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. The work schedule, which required him to work a Friday shift from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. was set out in the collective agreement between the Okanagan School Board and C.U.P.E., Local 523. Accommodating Mr. Renaud's religious beliefs would have required allowing him to work hours different than those specified. The respondent school board and union could not agree on a means of accommodating Mr. Renaud and as a result he was dismissed from his job. The B.C. Council of Human Rights found that though it was a bona fide requirement that a custodian be present in the schools, it was not a bona fide requirement that a custodian in Mr. Renaud's school work the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift on Fridays. The Council concluded that Mr. Renaud should have been accommodated and that both the employer and the union were liable for the failure to do so.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Human Rights Comm.) and Bhinder, the B.C. Supreme Court overturned the B.C. Council of Human Rights decision. It ruled that once a bona fide occupational requirement is established no accommodation is necessary. The B.C. Court of Appeal upheld the B.C. Supreme Court's judgment.

1. whether regular attendance which is in accordance with a schedule established by an employer is a bona fide occupational requirement providing a complete defence to a complaint of discrimination on the grounds of religious belief; and
2. whether an employer or a trade union is under any obligation to accommodate an employee who, because of his religious beliefs, is unable to work a particular shift.

The Supreme Court of Canada, with Sopinka J. writing for the Court, finds that even where a bona fide occupational requirement is established an employer has an obligation to accommodate. The Court cites its earlier decision in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Comm.). There Sopinka J. writing for the minority of the Court and Wilson J. writing for the majority agreed that when adverse effect discrimination is at issue an employer can uphold a general rule but must consider whether the employee can be accommodated without undue hardship. The employer must show that no reasonable alternative to the discriminatory rule was possible.

On the first issue, therefore, the Supreme Court finds that the B.C. Council of Human Rights did not err when it found that there was a duty on the respondents to accommodate Mr. Renaud.

The Court then considers the nature of the duty to accommodate and what obligations that duty imposes on a trade union.

The Court rejects the respondents’ argument that the duty to accommodate is a de minimus one. This standard is one derived from American jurisprudence, and the legal context is very different. The case of Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Hardison, in which the de minimus rule was articulated, was argued on the basis of the establishment clause in the American constitution which prohibits the establishment of religion. The de minimus rule is inappropriate for the Canadian social context.

The employer argued that it refused to accommodate Mr. Renaud because it feared that a grievance would be filed if it violated the terms of the collective agreement by allowing him to work different hours. The Court finds that the existence of a collective agreement and the possibility of a grievance cannot be allowed to absolve parties to it of a duty to accommodate. Further, an employer's need to defend itself from a grievance, which will be unsuccessful in any case because employers and unions cannot contract out of human rights law, will not constitute an undue hardship. However, it will be relevant to assess a collective agreement to determine the degree of hardship involved for an employer or a union in interfering with its terms. Also the objections of other employees to an accommodation can be taken into account when assessing hardship but not where those objections are based on attitudes inconsistent with human rights. The Court finds no evidence in the record to suggest that the rights of other employees would have been affected by an accommodation of Mr. Renaud.

The Court finds that the union, like the employer, has a duty to accommodate. It rejects the argument that a union cannot be required to adopt measures which conflict with the collective agreement until an employer has exhausted reasonable accommodations that do not affect the collective rights of employees. It is not incumbent on the employer to exhaust all other possibilities first; the most reasonable accommodation may be one for which union approval is required, as it was in Mr. Renaud's case.

In Mr. Renaud's case, the Court finds that accommodation attempts failed because the union refused consent to allow Mr. Renaud to work a Sunday to a Thursday shift instead of Monday to Friday, and the employer refused to act unilaterally. The Court concluds that the Council was correct in finding both parties liable for discrimination against Mr. Renaud.

Drug-Testing Policy Discriminatory

Keywords:   DISABILITY — testing required to determine alcoholism — definition of handicap includes alcoholism — EMPLOYMENT EVALUATION AND TESTING — drug testing as a condition of employment — OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY — safety orders and regulations

BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION — absence of alcoholism — Etobicoke test — REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION — duty to accommodate where bona fide occupational qualification exists and where employment rule has discriminatory effect

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — definition of "handicap" — DISCRIMINATION — direct discrimination — EVIDENCE — balance of probabilities — EQUALITY — equal treatment

EMPLOYMENT — contracting out of human rights legislation — JURISDICTION — authority to hear case under the Charter — CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS — s. 8 (search or seizure) — PROCEDURE — adjournment to allow review of book of authorities — procedural fairness

Summary:  The Board of Inquiry finds that Imperial Oil Limited discriminated against Martin Entrop, a senior operator at the Sarnia Refinery, because of a handicap or a perceived handicap.

There is little disagreement in this case about the facts. The Board of Inquiry finds that under a new Alcohol and Drug Policy introduced in 1992, Imperial Oil employees in "safety-sensitive" positions were required to notify management if they currently had or had previously had a substance abuse problem. Knowing that this Policy would shortly come into effect, Mr. Entrop informed his employer in late 1991 that he had had an alcohol problem about ten years earlier, that he had attended Alcoholics Anonymous, and that he had abstained from using alcohol since 1984.

Though Mr. Entrop had been an employee for seventeen years and there had been no problems with Mr. Entrop's work that were related to substance abuse, the policy required that Mr. Entrop be immediately removed from his position. He was assigned to a less desirable one as an outside operator, with no loss of pay. He was informed that he would be retrained as a technician and that his wages would be frozen for five years until the pay rate for technicians caught up to his current rate of pay.

Subsequently, provisions were made in the policy to allow for reinstatement. Mr. Entrop applied for reinstatement to his position in March 1992. In order to obtain reinstatement Mr. Entrop was required to comply with a process of certification, which entailed undergoing medical and psychological evaluation. At the request of his employer, Mr. Entrop attended Parkside Lutheran Hospital in Park Ridge, Illinois, where he underwent extensive medical and psychological assessment. This assessment involved detailed examinations, canvassing such issues as Mr. Entrop's childhood upbringing, addiction history, marital and family history, religious history, use of tobacco, demeanour, emotional affectations, parenting skills, exercise regime, intelligence levels, stress levels, sleeping patterns, levels of self-esteem, current lifestyle, grooming and coping skills. This resulted in a conclusion that his "alcohol dependence was in remission" and that there were "no psychological or psychiatric reasons that would prevent the patient from resuming his full duties at this time." Mr. Entrop's supervisors also indicated that there were no performance concerns that could be in any way associated with substance abuse.

On May 15, 1992, Imperial Oil notified Mr. Entrop that he would be reinstated to his former position as senior operator if he would agree to sign an undertaking regarding post-reinstatement controls. The undertaking provided that he would undergo additional unannounced alcohol testing at least twice per quarter, continue to abstain from alcohol, report to his supervisor any alcohol or drug-related charges, report any changes in his circumstances that might increase the risk of relapse, undergo an annual medical examination, agree to quarterly performance and compliance reviews, agree to be subject to Imperial Oil's Alcohol and Drug Policy, and agree that his reinstatement was subject to maintaining satisfactory job performance and compliance with these conditions.

Though Mr. Entrop felt that he was being singled out and treated differently because there were other employees who did drink who were not subject to these conditions, Mr. Entrop signed the undertaking and complied with it in order to be reinstated in his job.

All random tests done on Mr. Entrop were negative for the presence of any alcohol or drugs. In view of his continued sobriety and the consistent pattern of negative tests results, Imperial Oil reviewed the original conditions of Mr. Entrop's undertaking in January 1995. The requirements for additional unannounced tests and yearly medical examinations were dropped. Quarterly performance reviews were eliminated, and the stipulation that his reinstatement was conditional upon maintaining satisfactory job performance was also deleted. Other conditions remained in effect.

The Board of Inquiry finds that although the definition of handicap in the Ontario Human Rights Code does not specifically include "alcoholism" or "dependence on alcohol" or "alcoholism in remission," expert evidence lead in the hearing indicates that "alcoholism" fits without difficulty into the definition of handicap, as an illness or disease creating physical disability or mental impairment, and interfering with physical, psychological and social functioning.

The Board also finds that the prohibition against discrimination "because of handicap" proscribes discrimination against persons who had a handicap at some time. The evidence in this case indicates that whatever risk of relapse Mr. Entrop might have posed in fact, his employer based its employment decisions upon its knowledge of Mr. Entrop's prior alcohol dependency. The language of the Code attempts to protect individuals who are "believed to have or have had" a handicap. Past alcoholism, however remote in time, also constitutes a "handicap" under the Code, particularly to the extent that an individual continues to be perceived as addicted or dependent.

The Board of Inquiry rejects Imperial Oil's argument that Mr. Entrop was treated equally and without discrimination because he was treated no differently than other employees in safety-sensitive positions. The respondent argued that it was required to make an assessment of the risk Mr. Entrop posed, and that at the conclusion of this assessment he was reinstated in his position with no loss of opportunity, status, or rate of pay.

However, the Board finds that requiring employees to identify and stigmatize themselves as having (or having had) a substance abuse problem amounts to direct discrimination under the Code. In addition, as a consequence of Mr. Entrop's disclosure, he was removed from his position because of his "perceived handicap." This action also constitutes direct discrimination, the Board finds. Finally, Mr. Entrop was subjected to a lengthy process of assessment and certification prior to obtaining reinstatement in July 1992, and required to accede to a series of conditions which were not imposed on other employees without handicaps or perceived handicaps. This too constitutes a form of direct discrimination.

To defend its actions, the respondent must show that it developed the Alcohol and Drug Policy in good faith in order to prevent handicapped persons from undertaking duties which they were incapable of performing, and that under the standard of reasonable necessity, Mr. Entrop was incapable of fulfilling the essential requirements of a safety-sensitive job because of his history of alcohol dependence.

The Board of Inquiry accepts that Imperial Oil developed the Alcohol and Drug Policy in good faith, believing that it would result in a substantial reduction in accidents due to impairment.

The Board of Inquiry also finds that being free of alcohol impairment is an essential requirement for safety-sensitive jobs at Imperial Oil. However, the evidence does not establish that, due to his past alcohol abuse problem, Mr. Entrop was incapable of meeting this requirement. An employer needs to provide substantive evidence that an employee's physical or mental condition is having a negative impact on job performance. The evidence here falls far short of that standard.

The Board of Inquiry concludes that the respondent failed to meet the second branch of the bona fide occupational requirement test because it could not show that the treatment of Mr. Entrop was objectively justified as reasonably necessary.

Even if the Board had found differently on this point, Imperial Oil would still be required to show that it had accommodated the complainant pursuant to s. 17(2) of the Code. The Board of Inquiry rejects Imperial Oil's argument that the self-declaration, reassignment and assessment measures it took pursuant to the policy were an "accommodation" of Mr. Entrop as required by s. 17(2).

While Imperial Oil has the right to attempt to ensure that employees in safety-sensitive positions are not impaired by alcohol, because freedom from impairment by alcohol is a bona fide occupational requirement for such jobs, the methods of assessment chosen by Imperial Oil, such as mandatory self-disclosure and automatic reassignment out of safety-sensitive positions, are more questionable. Where alternative measures exist, such as supervisory monitoring programs, peer-control programs, and employee assistance programs, employers should utilize the least drastic means of assessing its work force for alcohol impairment risks. Mandatory self-disclosure of past alcohol dependency, no matter how long ago in the past, is an unreasonable requirement, as is automatic reassignment. Also, the undertaking Mr. Entrop was required to make to obtain reinstatement, given the low risk of relapse that he presented, was intrusive, excessive and unjustified.

The Board of Inquiry concludes that neither mandatory self-disclosure of past dependency, nor automatic reassignment, nor reinstatement pursuant to the controls set out in Mr. Entrop's undertaking meet the requirements of "accommodation" under s. 17(2) of the Code.

Argument and decision regarding remedies is postponed until other aspects of the complaint are dealt with.

(For summary of the appeal decision see: Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Entrop (1998), 30 C.H.R.R. D/433 (Ont. Ct.(Gen.Div.)).)

Drug-Testing Policy to be Reconsidered

Keywords:   EMPLOYMENT EVALUATION AND TESTING — drug testing as a condition of employment — BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION — drug testing for bank employee — DISABILITY — testing required to determine drug dependence — DISCRIMINATION -- adverse effect discrimination — REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION — duty to accommodate short of undue hardship

EMPLOYMENT — contracting out of human rights legislation — JURISDICTION — authority to hear case under the Charter — CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS — s. 8 (search or seizure) -- PROCEDURE — adjournment to allow review of book of authorities — procedural fairness

Summary:  This is an application for judicial review, in which the Canadian Human Rights Commission seeks an order quashing a decision of the Human Rights Tribunal made August 16, 1994. In the decision below, the Tribunal dismissed a complaint brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association alleging that employee drug-testing by the Toronto Dominion Bank constitutes discrimination based on disability. The disability in issue was described as perceived drug-dependence.

The Tribunal decided there was no discrimination because termination of employment under the policy applied to both drug-dependent employees, who are protected by the Act, and to persistent casual users, who are not protected by the Canadian Human Rights Act. The Tribunal concluded that any termination as a result of the policy was not based on discrimination, but rather resulted from an employee's breach of the policy which the Tribunal described as a condition of employment.

The Tribunal then considered what the outcome would be if it were mistaken in its initial analysis. In obiter, the Tribunal found the discrimination, if any, was adverse effect discrimination because all new and returning employees were required to undergo drug-testing, and only those who tested positive more than once would be negatively affected. The Tribunal also decided that the employer satisfied the obligation of reasonable accommodation by providing for rehabilitation at its expense. Also in obiter, however, the Tribunal observed that if the drug-testing constituted direct discrimination the Bank had not established that it had a bona fide occupational requirement to justify the policy because it had not shown that being drug-free was necessary for the efficient and safe performance of jobs in the Bank.

The Federal Court holds that this is a case of adverse effect discrimination, and that in cases of adverse effect discrimination there will be a group that is negatively affected by an apparently neutral rule, and within that group a sub-group to which the rule applies in a negative and illegal fashion. In this case, all those facing termination because of drug use are negatively affected, but there is a sub-group who experience adverse effect discrimination because they are drug-dependent, and are persons with disabilities under the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The Court finds further that the Tribunal erred in failing to explicitly identify a rational connection between drug-testing and job performance. The Tribunal decision is set aside and the matter is referred back to the Tribunal to deal with the question of whether the drug-testing policy is rationally related to the employment.

Keywords:   APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW — appeal of damage award — error of law in interpreting evidence and in interpreting legislation — COURTS — ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS — standard of review of court over administrative tribunals — HUMAN RIGHTS — nature and purpose of human rights legislation — DISABILITY — discriminatory treatment in employment on the basis of alcoholism — perceived disability — disabled employee's disclosure of disability — INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — definition of "handicap" — EMPLOYMENT EVALUATION AND TESTING — drug testing as a condition of employment — BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION — absence of alcoholism for refinery employee — OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY — safety orders and regulations — DISCRIMINATION — safety risk as reasonable cause for discriminatory treatment — definition of discrimination

Summary:  This is an appeal by Imperial Oil Limited from a number of decisions issued by an Ontario Board of Inquiry in the case of Martin Entrop. The Board of Inquiry ruled that Imperial Oil's alcohol and drug policy violated ss. 5 and 17 of the Ontario Human Rights Code which protects Ontario residents from discrimination based on disability. It also ruled that Martin Entrop had been discriminated against by Imperial Oil. The policy required employees in safety-sensitive positions to disclose any "substance abuse problems," whether current or past. Employees who disclosed such problems were reassigned to positions that were not safety-sensitive and would not be reinstated to their original positions for a minimum of seven years. Employees were also required to undergo random testing.

After this policy was put in place, Martin Entrop disclosed that he had had an alcohol abuse problem in the past, but that he no longer used alcohol. He was removed from his position, reassigned, and subjected to various forms of evaluation and testing. The Board of Inquiry found that his treatment was discriminatory.

The Board of Inquiry ordered Imperial Oil to pay Mr. Entrop special damages to compensate him for the loss of overtime, to remove assessments of Mr. Entrop from his personnel files, to pay him $10,000 as general damages, and $10,000 as compensation for mental anguish based on the wilful and reckless manner of the infringement.

The Board of Inquiry also ruled that:

• Imperial Oil's alcohol and drug policy, was too broad because it required employees in safety-sensitive positions to disclose any "substance abuse problems," whether current or past;
• the provisions of the policy that set out a minimum seven-year period between reassignment and potential reinstatement violated the Code because this length of time was not necessary in all cases;
• the mandatory conditions and undertakings for reinstatement were unlawful because this was more than was necessary in certain instances;
• the provisions of the policy that provided for pre-employment and random testing were unlawful because Imperial Oil failed to prove that a positive test was correlated with impairment;
• the provisions of the policy that provide for random alcohol testing were unlawful because Imperial Oil failed to prove that such screening was reasonably necessary to deter alcohol impairment on the job.

1. the Board of Inquiry erred in law by holding that s. 5 of the Human Rights Code had any application where an alcohol and drug policy is a reasonable work rule;
2. the Board of Inquiry had no jurisdiction to expand the complaint into the area of drug testing;
3. the Board of Inquiry erred in law in its analysis and application of ss. 5 and 17 of the Human Rights Code;
4. the Board of Inquiry erred in its acceptance of certain evidence;
5. the Board of Inquiry erred in determining the appropriate remedy for Mr. Entrop.

The Court rejects Imperial Oil's argument that s. 5 of the Code is inapplicable because its alcohol and drug policy was directed to the safety of the property of Imperial Oil and to the safety of the public. The Court finds that accepting this view would make s. 5 meaningless. Imperial Oil failed to prove that its treatment of Mr. Entrop was objectively justified as reasonably necessary for the safety of Imperial Oil's property and the public when all the facts, including the period of time since Entrop had conquered his former abuse problem, were taken into account.

The Court also finds that the Board of Inquiry was justified in considering whether the alcohol and drug policy, as a whole, was in violation of the Code, after it had determined that Mr. Entrop's treatment was discriminatory. The Court agrees with the Board of Inquiry that it would make a mockery of the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of handicap if employers were free to impose disadvantageous work rules so long as they did so universally.

With respect to the Board of Inquiry's conclusions regarding drug abuse as a handicap, the discriminatory effects of testing, and the failure to show a direct connection between testing and job performance, the Court finds that these were reasonable, as were its assessments of the evidence.

Finally, the Court finds that the award to Mr. Entrop was not excessive, in light of the ability of Imperial Oil to pay and the low maximum provided in the Code.

(For summary of the Board of Inquiry decision on the merits see Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (No. 6) (1995), 23 C.H.R.R. D/196 (Ont. Bd.Inq.))